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Criminal Procedure, the Police, and The Wire as
Dissent
Bennett Capers†
The Wire is rich with metaphors. There is the physical wire in the
opening credits, a metaphor for surveillance more generally. There is
the metaphor of the wire in the sense of a modern tightrope—another
filmic work, Man on a Wire,1 comes to mind—where any minute one
can lose one’s balance. There is even the metaphor of the wire in the
sense that the criminal justice system is all connected or networked.2
Indeed, thinking about our criminal justice system as a complex net-
work allows us to see that many of the perceived flaws in the criminal
justice system—racial disparities in charging3 and sentencing,4 and
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1 See generally MAN ON A WIRE (Magnolia Pictures 2008) (documentary about Phillipe Pet-
it’s successful attempt, on August 7, 1974, to walk on a wire suspended between the towers of the
World Trade Center; his act would later be described as the “artistic crime of the century”).
2 See Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, Our Criminal Network and The Wire, 8 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 459, 467–70 (2011); see also Susan A. Bandes, And All the Pieces Matter: Thoughts on
The Wire and the Criminal Justice System, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 435, 436 (2011) (“Although the
show begins as a description of an actual wiretap, the series soon turns out to be about a series of
interlocking systems, wired for dysfunction. . . . [It dramatizes] the criminal justice system as a
system.”).
3 See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE, WHITNEY TYMAS & MARY CROWLEY, VERA INST. OF
JUSTICE, RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 3 (2014), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-
web-assets/downloads/Publications/race-and-prosecution-in-manhattan/legacy_downloads/race-
and-prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXQ2-WUB2] (finding race to be a
statistically significant factor in case outcomes); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The
Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16–17 (1998) (discussing how prose-
cutorial discretion is a cause of racial inequality).
4 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 108 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/2012-booker/Part_A.pdf#page=55 [https://per
ma.cc/9X89-B3LP] (reporting that black male offenders received sentences nearly twenty percent
longer than white male offenders for the same crime in the Gall period); see also Joe Palazzolo,
Racial Gaps in Men’s Sentencing, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/SB10001424127887324432004578304463789858002 [https://perma.cc/4QDB-7ZKY].
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over-incarceration,5 to name a few—are not flaws but features.6 It is
another example of how we govern through crime.7
Again, these metaphors are rich, even generative, and when I set
out to write an essay as part of this symposium on the 10th Anniver-
sary of The Wire—in a sense a follow-up to an essay I contributed
years ago to an Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law symposium that I
guest-edited8—I thought these metaphors would be my focus. But
something curious happened as I began to re-watch The Wire. Of
course, I was moved by how good the show still is. There is the acting,
to be sure, but there is also the storytelling. What starts off as a nar-
rative about cops and drug dealers expands to include unions and the
school system and politicians and the media, becoming Dickensian in
scope9—indeed, the main character becomes the city of Baltimore it-
self. It is no surprise that Professor Susan Bandes calls The Wire “a
dazzling literary achievement, a riveting show: the greatest television
series ever made.”10 Or that the literary theorist Walter Benn
Michaels calls it “the most serious and ambitious fictional narrative of
the twenty-first century so far.”11 To be sure, I found plenty of scenes
to support my argument about metaphors. But as I re-watched the se-
ries, I also found myself drawn to something else: the disconnect be-
tween how the series depicts police officers in reality, and how the Su-
preme Court seems to depict officers in criminal procedure decisions.
It was almost as if the officers in The Wire are closer to reality, while
the officers the Court imagines are closer to fiction.12
5 For interesting discussions of the rise in incarceration in the United States, see generally,
e.g., JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE
REAL REFORM (2017) (arguing that changes in prosecutor behavior and the fragmentation of the
criminal justice system are the main drivers of mass incarceration); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that the
criminal justice system serves as a new system of racial control).
6 Paul Butler makes a similar argument. See generally Paul Butler, The System Is Working
the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016).
7 See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
8 See generally Symposium, The HBO Series The Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 431 (2011).
9 As David Simon puts it in his audio commentary on the first very episode, “It seems to be
a cop show, blue lights flashing . . . [but it’s] really about the American city and about how we try
to live together.” DVD: The Wire: The Target (HBO 2002) (Season One, Episode One) (audio
commentary); see also Jacob Weisberg, The Wire on Fire, SLATE (Sept. 13, 2006, 5:44 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_big_idea/2006/09/the_wire_on_fire.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/Q6XU-BM93] (describing The Wire as portraying “the social, political, and economic
life of an American city with the scope, observational precision, and moral vision of great litera-
ture”).
10 Bandes, supra note 2, at 445.
11 Quoted in SHERRYL VINT, THEWIRE 1 (2013).
12 That my attention was especially drawn to the depiction of police officers during this view-
ing, and the disconnect with the depiction of officers in criminal procedure jurisprudence, likely
has much to do with my recent interest in how the Court participates in the social construction of
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It is this disconnect between the Court’s fiction and The Wire’s re-
ality that is the focus of this brief essay. Some elaboration may al-
ready be in order. For starters, it may seem odd to talk about The
Wire’s reality, or more specifically its reality when it comes to the de-
piction of officers. After all, the television series is fictional. It contains
no voice-over announcing that it is based on true events. It is fiction,
entertaining fiction. But as law and literature scholars have long rec-
ognized, it is often through fictional tellings and retellings that we get
closest to the truth. Certainly, The Wire aspires to something akin to
truth.
Consider the filmic choices that suggest realism. Its creators set
The Wire in neither a fictional place nor somewhere that could be an-
ywhere. It is set in Baltimore, filmed in Baltimore, and often used lo-
cals with local Baltimore accents, such as Felicia Pearson, who played
a character named Felicia “Snoop” Pearson.13 As one scholar has writ-
ten, the series strives visually for social realism and “insist[s] that
these stories take place in a real city, that the fictional Baltimore ech-
oes and haunts the material city.”14
There are also substantive parallels to real life. The series is
based on real crime and reflects the real problems that exist in the
city. It uses almost exclusively diegetic music. And it is widely as-
sumed that the fictional Mayor Carcetti was based on Martin
O’Malley, who once served as Baltimore’s mayor, later served as
Maryland’s governor, and sought the Democratic Presidential nomina-
tion in 2015, competing as a sort of third wheel against Bernie Sand-
ers and Hillary Clinton.15 Even the fairly recent death of Freddie Gray
while in the custody of police in Baltimore16 seems like it could have
been taken from the cutting room floor of the writers’ room in The
Wire. The same can be said about the acquittal of the officers.17 All of
citizens vis-à-vis the police. See generally Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Cit-
izen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (2018). It makes sense that now my attention is drawn to the po-
lice.
13 The accents are so specific, and the slang so local, that this viewer often watched the show
with subtitles. For a discussion of the significance of the use of local actors and residents, as well
as actual locations in Baltimore, see VINT, supra note 11, at 83-87.
14 VINT, supra note 11, at 21.
15 See Seth Millstein, Martin O’Malley & The Wire Have a Bizarrely Awful History That
Isn’t Just Made for Hollywood, BUSTLE (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.bustle.com/articles/116324-
martin-omalley-the-wire-have-a-bizarrely-awful-history-that-isnt-just-made-for-hollywood
[https://perma.cc/55TY-AJ7M].
16 See Lindsey Bever & Abby Ohlheiser, Baltimore Police: Freddie Gray Died from a ‘Tragic
Injury to His Spinal Cord,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2015/04/20/baltimore-police-freddie-gray-arrested-without-force-or-incident-be
fore-fatal-injury/ [https://perma.cc/33ZW-PGZH].
17 See Paulina Dedaj, Six Officers Acquitted in Freddie Gray Case Now Back at Work,
FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/12/01/six-officers-acquitted-in-
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this brings to mind the ending of Season One, which ends with “a vi-
sion of business-as-usual continuing.”18 This is more than verisimili-
tude or mimesis. This is something closer to fiction-as-reality. Or as
one scholar has observed, “The Wire is not a thriller about a crime but
a quasi-journalistic analysis of crime as a social phenomenon.”19
Similarly, it may be odd to suggest that the Court, in its criminal
procedure opinions, depicts officers in an almost fictional way. But
this is precisely what the Court does. It certainly relies on an imagi-
nary world where all police officers are good, or at least presumptively
good. An imaginary world in which police officers have a singular ex-
pertise that entitles them to deference from citizens, and also from the
courts. An imaginary world where police officers are all trying to do
the right thing. But a close reading of Supreme Court cases shows this
is exactly the world the Court imagines.
This disconnect between how The Wire depicts officers, and how
the Court depicts officers, is the initial focus of this essay. It begins, in
Part One, by making the case that much of the Supreme Court’s crim-
inal procedure jurisprudence is predicated on the assumption that of-
ficers are good. Indeed, not only does the Supreme Court typically im-
agine a good cop—an Officer Friendly, if you will—but the Court’s
jurisprudence also plays a crucial role in encouraging citizens to think
of police officers as good. In this sense, the Court participates in the
social construction of the “good cop.”
Part Two returns the focus to The Wire and argues that, in con-
trast to the fiction the Court revels in, the series seems “truer” in de-
picting the reality of policing and the reality of police officers. The of-
ficers depicted—not just some of them, but all of them—are far more
complicated, three-dimensional, and self-interested than what the
Court imagines. Far from being good in an unadulterated way, the of-
ficers are not that different from the people they police.
Although the disconnect between the Supreme Court’s criminal
procedure jurisprudence and policing in reality is the initial focus of
this Article, the heart of this Article is in Part III. Part III argues that
much of the power of The Wire—and one reason it is so popular among
criminal justice scholars—lies in the fact that it offers a much needed
counter-narrative to the world the Court imagines. It challenges the
“official,” Court-promulgated thinking about criminal justice. In a very
real sense, The Wire places the audience as jury, and functions as its
freddie-gray-case-now-back-at-work.html [https://perma.cc/GY7Z-FJ76]. For an interesting dis-
cussion of the almost insurmountable procedural hurdles that advantage officers under investi-
gation of use of excessive force, see generally Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
1197 (2016).
18 VINT, supra note 11, at 3.
19 VINT, supra note 11, at 6.
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own exhibit. And to the Court and its criminal procedure jurispru-
dence, The Wire offers itself as a cogent and passionate dissent. Part
III explores this aspect of The Wire, and argues we need more shows
that offer “dissents.”
PART I: THE SUPREME COURT AND THEGOOD COP
In a very real sense, The Wire can be read as offering a much
needed “dissent” to the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurispru-
dence. To make this argument clear, it makes sense to begin with how
the Supreme Court imagines policing, i.e., the Supreme Court’s “ma-
jority” opinions. This first part accordingly focuses on a troubling as-
pect of the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence: in interpreting
what limits the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments place on the po-
lice in their interactions with “the people,” the Court tends to imagine
a perfectly good cop.20 The good cop is courteous, cares solely about
getting the bad guy off the street and bringing him to justice, is law-
abiding, does not engage in racialized policing, and is certainly in-
clined to adhere to any constraints placed on him by the Court. To a
large extent, the Court imagines an Officer Friendly.
Consider Terry v. Ohio,21 the case in which the Court gave its
blessing to forcible police stops of individuals even in the absence of
probable cause,22 which prior to Terry had been the minimum re-
quirement of a search and seizure.23 To accommodate the police, the
Court re-read the Fourth Amendment to focus on its reasonableness
clause, and to downplay its clause requiring probable cause. As I have
written previously, out of “this judicial legerdemain,”24 the Court fash-
ioned from whole cloth a standard less than probable cause: so long as
an officer could articulate reasonable suspicion to believe that “crimi-
nal activity may be afoot,”25 the officer could conduct a forcible limited
detention, or, in common parlance, a Terry stop. The Court coupled
this with another assist to law enforcement: expressing concern for of-
ficer safety, the Court also ruled that if the officer has reasonable sus-
20 The “good cop” paradigm that the Court adopts has not gone completely unnoticed. For a
discussion of the paradigm, see generally Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the In-
adequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence
and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151 (1994).
21 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
22 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968).
23 See id. at 20–22.
24 See Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1260 (2017).
25 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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picion that the detainee is armed or dangerous, the officer could add a
pat-down for weapons, or, in common parlance, a Terry frisk.26
While all of this is familiar to students of criminal procedure, any
understanding of the Court’s decision is incomplete without also rec-
ognizing the assumption about police officers that undergirds the
Court’s decision: that they are good (both morally and in their judg-
ment). For starters, the Court assumed that officers would not exploit
what I refer to as “Terry’s loophole”; although the decision ostensibly
requires officers to develop reasonable articulable suspicion prior to
conducting a stop or frisk, rather than after the fact, in fact Terry of-
fers no external checks to ensure an ex ante decision. In fact, the pro-
cess is such that an officer is not normally required to articulate his
basis for reasonable suspicion until a complaint is later drafted, or
still later in response to a suppression motion—in other words, decid-
edly ex post.27 Notwithstanding this loophole, the Court assumes that
officers will develop reasonable articulable suspicion before engaging
in a forcible stop or frisk, rather than exploit the decision’s loophole
and stop first, then justify the stop later. In short, the Court assumed
cops will be good. More troubling, the Court made this assumption
while likely aware of a long history of officers exploiting loopholes in
its rulings or otherwise circumventing them.28
And this is only one of the ways the Terry Court assumed a good
cop.29 Also undergirding its decision is the assumption that officers are
good in the sense that they will normally reach the right judgment
and thus are entitled to discretion in their determinations, which, in
turn, are entitled to deference.30 After all, this is the basis for allowing
26 See id. at 27.
27 It seems unlikely that the absence of any check to insure an ex ante determination of rea-
sonable suspicion escaped the Court’s attention. After all, it was the Court itself that set a
standard of articulable suspicion, not articulated suspicion.
28 For example, the Court was likely aware that many police officers responded to its deci-
sion a few years earlier extending the exclusionary rule to states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), not just by criticizing it, but also by circumventing it. “All of a sudden, there were more
‘dropsy’ cases. Instead of the evidence being found on the suspect, it had been dropped by the
suspect, and hence abandoned, making it admissible notwithstanding Mapp.” Bennett Capers,
Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 868 (2008). For more on the rise in dropsy
cases following the Court’s Mapp v. Ohio decision, see, e.g., Michael J. Juviler, A Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 741, 742–43 (1998); Note, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police
Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87, 94–96 (1968);
Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 9, 1967, at 596–97. The Court also down-
played the possibility that officers would conduct stops without justification. See Terry, 392 U.S.
at 13–15.
29 None of this is to suggest that the Court entirely ignored the possibility of a bad cop. Ra-
ther, the Court reduces the possibility to a rarity, something worthy of a footnote.
30 Other scholars have also noted the Court’s willingness, as well as the willingness of lower
courts, to defer to officers. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1883 (2015) (observing that courts “all too readily defer” to the judg-
ments of police officers); Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure,
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the officer—again, the “good cop”—to decide in the first instance
whether there is justification to engage in a stop and frisk. Prior to
Terry, there had long existed a preference for neutral and detached
magistrates to make decisions, via warrants, about whether there was
sufficient basis for a search or an arrest. The reasoning for this neu-
tral intervention was perhaps best articulated in Johnson v. United
States:31
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforce-
ment the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magis-
trate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.32
In Terry, the Court not only abandoned its preference for probable
cause, substituting the amorphous and less rigorous standard of rea-
sonable suspicion in its place. The Court also shifted the “decider”
from a neutral and detached magistrate to the police officer himself, at
least on the front end.33 This shift only makes sense if the Court as-
sumes officers have the expertise and neutrality to justify this defer-
ence.34 But even here, the Court seemed to be out of touch with reality,
even the reality of the case before it. Consider the detective’s expertise
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 408–09 (2013) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases in
which the Court chose to defer to the officers); Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Say-
ing? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
135, 149 (2002) (“Courts regularly presume that apprehending officers operate solely out of good
motives and the desire to achieve fairness; however, evidence shows that in high-crime areas,
this presumption is often false.”). Robin Magee is another such scholar. Here, her observation
about the interplay between deference and discretion bears repeating:
Deference and discretionary authority in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence sometimes
intersect and overlap. The Court’s deference may lead the Court by intent or by effect
to allow greater discretionary authority. The Court’s allowance of discretionary author-
ity may necessarily involve a level of deference. . . . An effect of the interplay between
discretion and deference is entrenchment of the good cop paradigm.
Magee, supra note 20, at 173.
31 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
32 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
33 Of course, for the few Terry stops that progress into arrests, a magistrate would decide if
probable cause existed for the arrest, and a later suppression hearing might focus on whether
reasonable suspicion existed to justify the initial stop, but these determinations are likely to be
weighted in favor of the police given hindsight bias, and, again, the ease with which officers can
articulate reasonable suspicion after the fact. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking War-
rants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1614 (2012) (discussing ex-post bias).
34 For an interesting discussion of “the presumption of police expertise from its origin out-
side the courtroom to its long march through the justice system,” see generally Anna Lvovsky,
The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 1999 (2017).
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in Terry. The following colloquy was elicited by the trial judge during
the suppression hearing:
Q. In your thirty-nine years of experience as an officer . . .
[h]ave you ever had any experience in observing the activities
of individuals in casing a place?
A. To be truthful with you, no.
Q. You never observed anybody casing a place?
A. No. . . .
Q. During your tenure as a police officer, during your 39 years
as a police officer, how many men have you had occasion to ar-
rest when you had observed them and felt as though they
might pull a stick-up?
A. To my recollection, I wouldn’t know, I don’t know if I had—I
don’t remember any.35
And yet none of this colloquy is included in the Terry opinion itself.
Had the Court done so, it would have had to wrestle with balancing
the needs of law enforcement officers against the intrusions to all of
the individuals in cases the officer was wrong. Instead, the Court con-
veniently treats Detective McFadden, and indeed all officers, as hav-
ing the experience and expertise to get it right and accurately deter-
mine when “criminal activity may be afoot.”36
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court conveniently
assumed that officers are fundamentally good and fundamentally
committed to doing the right thing. The Court certainly assumed that
officers would, for the most part, exercise their unilateral authority to
stop and frisk individuals in a manner that is race-neutral. But even
here, the Court seemed again to have an imaginary view of police of-
ficers. To be clear, the Court noted in passing that its decision could
have a disproportionate effect on minority communities.37 But for the
most part, the Court downplayed the possibility that there could be
wholesale race-based policing. Even in the facts before them, they like-
ly imagined Detective McFadden to be better than he was. During the
suppression hearing, Detective McFadden was asked what drew his
35 Defendants’ Bill of Exceptions, State v. Terry and State v. Chilton (Nos. 79,491 & 79,432),
reprinted in Appendix B, State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry:
The Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1387, 1420, 1477 (1998)
[hereinafter Transcript].
36 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
37 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 & n.11.
65] THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 73
attention to Terry and his companion. His answer is revealing. “Well,
to be truthful with you, I didn’t like them. I was just attracted to
them.”38 Later, when pressed again, he answered that “they didn’t
look right to me at the time.”39 Certainly the Court must have known
that the thing that very likely drew Detective McFadden’s attention to
the men was their race. They were two black men in a city that was
segregated by race, and they were in the part of the city that was
largely white.40 And certainly the Court must have realized that, had
Terry and his companion been white, it is very likely Detective
McFadden would not have noticed them at all. The Court sidestepped
this issue by assuming a good police officer, one who is for the most
part color-blind. Again, never mind reality.
Although the focus so far has been on the Court’s decision in
Terry v. Ohio, this is not to suggest Terry stands alone. In fact, the
Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence is replete with cas-
es in which the Court relies on an imaginary world where all police of-
ficers are good, or at least presumptively good. This imaginary “good
cop” world is the backdrop for the automobile exception41 announced
in Carroll v. United States,42 which assumes officers can be trusted
with making probable cause determinations to justify the search of
automobiles.43 Indeed, the Court’s esteem for police and their decision-
making perhaps explains why, nearly a century after the automobile
exception was announced, the Court continues to allow the exception.
After all, the original rationale for the exception was that, because of
their very mobility, securing a warrant to search a vehicle would be
difficult.44 This rationale made sense when only cars were mobile but
makes little sense today when telephones are mobile too, where
smartphones have become the new normal, and when securing a tele-
phonic warrant can be accomplished in seconds.45 But then again, the
38 Transcript, supra note 35, at 1456.
39 Id.
40 See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 460 n.17 (2000) (noting that the detec-
tive’s “‘professional judgment’ concerning Terry was based on the racial incongruity of Terry be-
ing observed outside a storefront in a commercial district far from the area of Cleveland where
most African Americans lived.”). For an analysis of the Court’s decision to elide race in Terry, see
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 956, 1013 (1999).
41 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 155–57 (1925).
42 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
43 Professor Magee makes a similar observation: the Court “has equated police decisions to
magistrate’s decisions, or has otherwise ruled that police deliberations are tantamount to a mag-
istrate’s deliberations.” Magee, supra note 20, at 182.
44 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
45 For more on this point, see generally Bennett Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal
Assists, 69 FLA. L. REV. 723 (2017).
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continued availability of the automobile exception does make sense if
one assumes, as the Court does, the basic goodness of officers, who will
decide which cars to search on probable cause alone, untainted by bi-
ases. In short, if one assumes a “good cop.”
Add to the list Pennsylvania v. Mimms46 and Maryland v. Wil-
son,47 which gave officers carte blanche to order a driver out of a vehi-
cle following a traffic stop,48 and to order the driver’s passengers out
as well,49 if the officer so chooses, in order to protect the officer’s safe-
ty. What undergirds these decisions is the Court’s assumption that of-
ficers will not abuse this discretion. What undergirds these decisions,
too, is the Court’s assumption that officers need to be protected from
civilians, and not the other way around.50
One could add California v. Hodari D.,51 which held that a com-
mand to stop, without voluntary submission or a physical apprehen-
sion, does not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.52 But in so holding, the Court adds something else:
“[C]ompliance with police orders to stop should . . . be encouraged. On-
ly a few of those orders, we must presume, will be without adequate
basis.”53 In other words, the Court presumes officers will issue orders
to stop only for good cause, untainted by whim, caprice, or bias. There
is Rhode Island v. Innis,54 in which the Court assumed that two offic-
ers discussing all the reasons why the defendant they were transport-
ing should tell them where he hid the murder weapon—a defendant
who had invoked his Miranda v. Arizona55 rights—were not engaged
in interrogation,56 because of course that would mean the officers were
circumventing Miranda, and officers would not engage in such trick-
ery, the officers were good officers, concerned only with public safety.57
46 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
47 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
48 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam).
49 SeeMaryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–415 (1997).
50 Cf. id. at 414 (concluding that passengers create additional danger for officers making
traffic stops); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (describing the risks to officer safety involved in traffic
stops).
51 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
52 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
53 Id. at 627.
54 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
55 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 295, 300–02 (1980).
57 That the Court assumed officers would not have ulterior motives or engage in such trick-
ery seems particularly disingenuous since the Court has routinely permitted officers to engage in
trickery during interrogations. For a discussion of the Court’s endorsement of trickery during
confessions, see generally Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for
Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791
(2006); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979)
65] THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 75
There is United States v. Drayton,58 a case resulting from a dragnet-
like bus sweep of passengers, which held that a person has not been
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if a “reasonable
person” would have felt free to “leav[e] . . . or otherwise terminat[e]
the encounter.”59 In adopting this test, the Court took the officer at his
word that any passenger who declined consent to answer a few ques-
tions “would have been allowed to do so without argument.”60 The
Court also took the officer at his word that some passengers “go so far
as to commend the police for their efforts to ensure the safety of their
travel.”61
Again, the list continues. There is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,62
the case that solidified the consent exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment,63 since underlying the Court’s decision is the assumption that
officers really will ask for consent rather than insist on it.64 Indeed,
the assumption that cops are good even underlies the Court’s recent
decision in Utah v. Strieff,65 in which it extended the doctrine of at-
tenuation to hold that even when a police stop is completely unjusti-
fied, evidence discovered during the stop—in Strieff, evidence that the
suspect had an outstanding warrant—may still be admissible.66 After
all, the Court assumed that the officers could be trusted to exercise re-
straint and would not use the Court’s decision as carte blanche to en-
(detailing the prevalence of trickery).
58 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
59 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 195 (2002).
60 See id. at 198.
61 See id.
62 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
63 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973) (holding that “whether a
consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances”).
64 This is not to suggest the Court ignored the possibility that some officers may coerce con-
sent. Rather, the main point here is the Court deferred almost entirely to the police in determin-
ing how to obtain consent so long as coercion is absent. This is free rein indeed. It is telling that
police manuals train officers in how to psychologically position individuals so that they feel obli-
gated to grant consent. It is telling too that studies show the overwhelming majority of individu-
als who grant consent do not view their consent as truly voluntary. For more on this point, see
Bennett Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists, 69 FLA. L. REV. 723, 746–47 (2017).
65 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016).
66 The Court based its holding by claiming that discovery of the warrant was an “intervening
circumstance” that was “entirely unconnected to the stop,” and by assuming—again, assuming a
good cop—that the officer who made the unjustified stop was “at most negligent.” In the words of
Orin Kerr, the case “goes a long way toward creating an exception to the exclusionary rule for
searches of persons who have outstanding warrants (which turns out to be a lot of people.” See
Orin Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rules is Weakened, But Still Lies, SCOTUS
BLOG.COM, June 20, 2016. For additional critique of this reasoning in Strieff, see Julian A. Cook
III, The Wrong Decision at the Wrong Time: Utah v. Strieff in the Era of Aggressive Policing, 70
SMU L. REV. 293 (2017).
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gage in wholesale stops without reasonable suspicion,67 even in juris-
dictions where “policing through bench warrants”68 is an accepted po-
lice practice.69 And, in a certain respect, this juridical belief in the
“good cop” is evident in the rationale for the Fourth Amendment’s ex-
clusionary rule and its corollaries under the Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment.70 After all, the exclusionary rule assumes a good
cop who ultimately is committed to justice, to ensuring that the inno-
cent go free and the guilty are punished. It certainly does not imagine
an officer whose sole interest is in receiving a stat for an arrest and
who is indifferent to how the case proceeds after the arrest has been
made—especially since, absent patently egregious behavior, neither
his salary nor advancement is likely to turn on whether evidence in a
case was later suppressed on a “technicality”71 or not. Or, in the words
of Justice Cardozo, that “the criminal is to go free because the consta-
ble has blundered.”72
So, little of Officer Friendly squares with reality, at least not from
where I am positioned. As such, is it any wonder that it makes sense
to think of the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence as
predicated on a fiction? The Part below elaborates upon this and, by
turning to the “fictional” series The Wire, adds a dose of reality.
PART II: THEWIRE AND REAL COPS
If the prototypical law enforcement officer the Supreme Court
imagines when it decides criminal procedure cases is the quintessen-
tial good cop, an Officer Friendly in everything but name, the cops
who populate The Wire are far more complex. The Wire is less inter-
67 Cf. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (“[Respondent] argues that, because of the
prevalence of outstanding arrest warrants in many jurisdictions, police will engage in dragnet
searches if the exclusionary rule is not applied. We think that this outcome is unlikely. Such
wanton conduct would expose police to civil liability.”).
68 See Bennett Capers, Techno-Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 465, 501.
69 For example, as recently as two years ago, New York City had about 1.4 million open war-
rants for citizens stemming from quality of life offenses like walking a dog without a leash and
being in a park after closing hours. See How NYC Is Tackling 1.4 Million Open Warrants for
‘Quality-of-Life’ Crimes, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 16, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/bb/how-nyc-is-tackling-1-4-million-open-arrest-warrants-for-quality-of-life-crimes/ [https://
perma.cc/U6SC-D4VD].
70 For a lengthier discussion of this point, see Magee, supra note 20, at 161–67 (arguing,
among other things, that the Court’s rejection of remedies other than exclusion also suggests “ei-
ther that the Court did not contemplate cops not being motivated by law enforcement interests or
that the Court believed bad cops comprised only a small insignificant minority of cops.”) (internal
citations omitted).
71 See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development,
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393
(1983).
72 See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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ested in “good, if sometimes imperfect”73 cops and more interested
what real cops and detectives are like in reality. Or to put it more ac-
curately, fiction narrative in The Wire is instrumental: it is deployed
to reveal a deeper truth.74 It subverts the trope of the standard police
procedural75 by complicating both the supposed “good guys” and sup-
posed “bad guys” until the adjectives good and bad become meaning-
less. In short, “The Wire is a different kind of television.”76
None of the officers in The Wire could be categorized as “good, if
sometimes imperfect.” This is not to suggest that the cops depicted in
The Wire are “bad.” Far from it. They are simply real. They are com-
plicated. They are compromised. They are true. The show reveals law
enforcement officers for what they often are: self-interested bit players
in a system that is larger than they are. This is true even of the puta-
tive hero,77 Detective McNulty, who at first comes across as good, if
sometimes imperfect—he drinks too much, was a poor husband and
father, sleeps with the prosecutor on the case,78 and suborns perjury.79
He always believes he’s the smartest person in the room and therefore
must be right. By Season Five, Detective McNulty is so driven by ego
and assured in his judgment that he misappropriates police funds and
compromises other homicide investigations and, indeed, lets dozens of
other homicides become cold, unsolved and all but unsolvable.80 In a
lesser drama, the viewer might come to see Detective McNulty as an
73 See Bandes, supra note 2, at 435.
74 See, e.g., J.M. Tyree, Review of The Wire: The Complete Fourth Season, 61 FILM Q. 32, 38
(2008) (“The Wire is in the business of telling America truths about itself that would be unbeara-
ble even if it were interesting in hearing them.”); VINT, supra note 11, at 83 (“The Wire’s claim to
significance is based on its commitment to social realism and its willingness to tell a ‘truth’ about
crime and justice that is obscured by both other popular culture and mainstream discourses
about crime.”). David Simon, the creator of The Wire, has described the series as “non-fiction
truthtelling.” See David Simon, A Final Thank You to The Wire Fans, HBO.COM (Mar. 10, 2008),
https://www.hbo.com/the-wire/a-final-thank-you-to-the-wire-fans [https://perma.cc/R8Z8-P4HH].
75 As Susan Bandes has written, the standard police procedural “adheres to time-honored
conventions. It focuses on good, if sometimes imperfect, cops trying to find the real bad guys—the
perpetrators—and bring them to justice.” See Bandes, supra note 2, at 435.
76 See Bandes, supra note 2, at 435.
77 Although The Wire seems anchored around Detective McNulty, apparently this was done
as a concession to HBO Marketing, which thought it would be easier to market the series by hav-
ing a white protagonist at its center. See VINT, supra note 11, at 16.
78 Perhaps needless to say, the relationship between the prosecutor and Detective McNulty
presents a conflict of interest, curable only through disclosure. For more on this issue, see gener-
ally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L.
REV. 463 (2017).
79 As Alafair Burke points out, Detective McNulty essentially suborns perjury when he per-
mits Omar Little to testify in a murder trial in Season One. See Alafair S. Burke, I Got the Shot-
gun: Reflections on The Wire, Prosecutors, and Omar Little, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 447, 450–52
(2011).
80 See The Wire: Clarifications (HBO television broadcast Feb. 24, 2008) (Season Five, Epi-
sode Eight).
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anti-hero. But not in The Wire. In The Wire, Detective McNulty is ac-
tually similar to all of the other cops: complicated, compromised, and
true.
Indeed, one of the striking things about The Wire is how it uses
parallels and juxtapositions to complicate the depiction of police offic-
ers.81 Consider Season One. On its surface and at its most basic, Sea-
son One could be viewed as following a traditional cop show script. On
one side is the cop pursuing justice, and on the other side is the crimi-
nal hoping to evade justice. But as noted earlier, The Wire takes this
premise and expands upon it while at the same time subverting it. Ra-
ther than having at its center one “good, if sometimes imperfect” cop
and one “bad guy,” Season One has at its center two organizations: On
one side is the Baltimore Police Department and a subunit task force
headed by Lieutenant Daniels but in effect run by Detective McNulty.
On the other side is Barksdale’s Crew, which is headed by Avon
Barksdale but in effect run by Stringer Bell. Rather than adhering to
the typical police procedural by depicting good against bad, The Wire
uses parallels and juxtapositions to show the similarities between
both organizations and their members.
For starters, Season One of The Wire routinely intercuts scenes of
the cops of the Baltimore Police Department with scenes of the mem-
bers of Barksdale’s crew to suggest parallels. Indeed, one of the open-
ing scenes depicts Detective McNulty sitting in the gallery of a court-
room as D’Angelo Barksdale is tried for homicide.82 In the well of the
courtroom, the prosecutor is on one side while the defense lawyer is on
the other. In the gallery, Detective McNulty sits on one side, while a
handsome black man sits on the other. Although the viewer doesn’t
yet know it, the black man is Stringer Bell, Barksdale’s second-in-
command. McNulty and Bell eye each other. Both men are dressed in
nearly identical suits. Only gradually does the viewer sense that Bell
is McNulty’s counterpart, his dopplegänger—in a way, they are each
the “brains” in their respective operations. And each eventually fails
in part because of hubris. In the courtroom, and in reality, all that re-
ally separates them is the aisle.
81 See, e.g., VINT, supra note 11, at 15 (“The Wire is careful to add as much complexity to its
criminal characters as it provides for the police, stressing the parallels between individuals try-
ing to accommodate themselves to the institutions they must serve rather than highlighting
their differences as people on opposite sides of the law.”); Burke, supra note 79, at 449 (“One way
in which The Wire subtly calls into question the legitimacy of supposedly legitimate enterprises
is by drawing narrative parallels between the drug game on the street . . . and recognized insti-
tutions and bureaucracies.”).
82 See The Wire: The Target (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002) (Season One, Episode
One).
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This is just one of the parallels between the drug organization and
the police department. Indeed, as I noted in a prior essay, one of the
most telling scenes in Season One is when Omar (a gangster) and a
homicide detective realize they were in high school together.83 Another
parallel: both organizations have individuals who seem “expert” at
what they do—again, Detective McNulty of the Police Department and
Stringer Bell of Barksdale’s Crew. But both organizations also have
individuals who are slackers, who cut corners, and who are decidedly
inexpert—think Officers Herc and Pryzbylewski of the Police Depart-
ment and Poot and Bodie of Barksdale’s Crew.84
The parallels also reveal how self-interest and conflicts influence
characters in both organizations.85 A scene showing Barksdale’s or-
ganization trying to determine whether workers are skimming money
or drugs86 follows a scene in which police detectives skim from taxpay-
ers by falsely claiming overtime, exaggerate injuries to claim early
pensions, and even plot how to stage injuries.87 A scene in which
members of Barksdale’s organization engage in casual sexism and rac-
ism and homophobia is soon followed by a scene in which members of
the police department engage in the same.88 Perhaps most important-
ly, the parallels reveal that the use of violence is not limited to crimi-
nals. To be sure, members of Barksdale’s organization engage in gra-
83 See The Wire: One Arrest (HBO television broadcast July 21, 2002) (Season One, Episode
Seven).
84 Even here, the creators of The Wire refuse to pigeon hole characters. Officer Pryzbylewski
comes across as incompetent, and yet is the officer who figures out how members of Barksdale’s
Crew are using pagers and phone booths to send messages. See The Wire: The Pager (HBO tele-
vision broadcast June 30, 2002) (Season One, Episode Five). For his part, when Barksdale’s stash
house is robbed, Bodie proves an astute observer; he notes that he heard the name Omar and
saw a white van. See The Wire: The Buys (HBO television broadcast June 16, 2002) (Season One,
Episode Three). Building on the chess metaphor, Vint observes that Bodie establishes himself as
a “smart-ass pawn.” VINT, supra note 11, at 26.
85 Vint makes a similar observation:
The first season constructs parallels between the drug enterprise and the police de-
partment, often through intercut scenes, demonstrating that in each those lower in the
hierarchy must find ways to accommodate the at-times capricious demands of those
above and reinforcing a sense that the drug enterprise is, from the point of view of
many involved, merely employment. In each site, numbers drive goals, seemingly a
reasonable expectation for a sales enterprise like the drug trade but one that hinders
legitimate investigative work when applied to the police department.
VINT, supra note 11, at 65.
86 See The Wire: The Pager, supra note 84 (Season One, Episode Five).
87 See The Wire: Old Cases (HBO television broadcast June 23, 2002) (Season One, Episode
Four).
88 Compare, for example, Episode Two and Episode Three, in which officers casually use the
“n__” word and refer to a suspect as a “monkey,” with Episode Four, in which Avon Barksdale’s
crew doubles the bounty on Omar after learning he is “all faggot.” See The Wire: The Detail (HBO
television broadcast June 9, 2002) (Season One, Episode 2); The Wire: The Buys, supra note 84
(Season One, Episode 3); The Wire: Old Cases, supra note 87 (Season One, Episode 4).
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tuitous violence. But so do those charged with upholding the law. They
may not engage in outright homicides, but they certainly engage in
beat downs.
Since the violence Barksdale’s Crew engages in is already part of
the standard trope when it comes to drug dealers—so much so that
there exists an “assumed premise that drugs cause violence,”89 so
much so that the courts have essentially given officers an automatic
right to frisk drug suspects for weapons90—I will not rehearse their vi-
olence here. But consider the violence by police officers. In one of the
earliest scenes involving a police raid on a drug spot, Bodie resists ar-
rest by punching an officer, who quickly falls to the ground but is oth-
erwise unhurt. Other officers respond by tackling Bodie and giving
him a proper beat down. The camera pans to Detective Kima Greggs.
The viewer expects Greggs, described as “the moral compass” of the
show,91 to try to stop the police use of excessive force. Instead, she
pushes herself through the scrum so that she can land some punches
on Bodie herself. After all, police officers must stand together.92
In another scene, Officers Herc, Pryzbylewski, and Carver, after a
night of drinking, decide to drive to the Towers to show the residents
that they (the police) run things. As Herc puts it, “Let’s show these
motherfuckers who [we] are.”93 The officers approach the first two
teenagers they see and engage in the very type of stop that the Court
in Terry assumed would be rare because cops would be good—a stop
not based on reasonable articulable suspicion or even getting the “bad”
guys but rather a stop to show control. Or, to borrow from Professor
Frank Rudy Cooper, to show “Who’s the Man.”94 The officers force the
two teenagers to drop their pants and lie spread-eagle on the ground,
a practice Professor Paul Butler rightly describes as sexual “torture-
lite.”95 Carver and Herc also yell to onlookers, “[We] own these towers
89 See generally Shima Barararan, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227 (2015) (explor-
ing the assumption and showing its lack of empirical support).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[T]he need to
frisk those suspected of committing a narcotics offense in the course of a street encounter is obvi-
ous.”); United States v. Vasquez, 634 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he detectives were justified
in making a protective frisk . . . particularly in view of the violent nature of narcotics crime.”);
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977) (describing firearms as the “tools of the
trade” of narcotics dealers); United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1987) (describing
concealed weapons as “part and parcel for the drug trade”); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 169
(Ohio 1993) (“The right to frisk is virtually automatic when individuals are suspected of commit-
ting a crime, like drug trafficking, for which they are likely to be armed.”).
91 Bandes, supra note 2, at 442.
92 See The Wire: The Buys, supra note 84 (Season One, Episode Three).
93 See The Wire: The Detail, supra note 88 (Season One, Episode Two).
94 See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops,
and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 671 (2009).
95 See Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities,
65] THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 81
[and we’re] sick of this shit!” Apparently hoping to one-up his col-
leagues, Officer Pryzbylewski approaches a third teenager and yells,
“Move, shitbird!” When the youth points out that he’s not breaking the
law, Officer Pryzbylewski uses the butt of his pistol to hit the youth in
his eye, blinding him.
And these scenes, from Season One, are just some of the acts of
police violence. There is another parallel worth noting here: Just as
members of Barksdale’s Crew come up with a story to secure the ac-
quittal of D’Angelo Barksdale in the first episode,96 members of the
Baltimore Police Department come up with a story to preserve and
protect the Police Department from charges of excessive force. After
Officer Pryzbylewski blinds the youth at the Towers, the three officers
try explaining to Lieutenant Daniels what happened:
Carver: They jumped us, boss.
Daniels: Who?
Carver: Fucking project niggers.
Daniels: What are you doing here at two in the morning?
Carver: Field interviews, police work.
Daniels: Police work? I got a fourteen-year-old in critical but
stable condition at university and two witnesses who say one of
you princes coldcocked him with a pistol.97
Lieutenant Daniels makes his displeasure known, but then in-
structs them to lie to Internal Affairs:
Daniels: [Internal Affairs] is going to be on all three of you by
afternoon and if you don’t get a story straight by then you’re
going to have a file thick enough to see the light of a trial
board. Now tell me. Who coldcocked the kid?
[Silence. Finally Officer Pryzbylewski acknowledges his act of
assault.]
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 58 (2015); see also Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk: Sex, Torture, and Con-
trol, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT, LAW AS REGULATION 166 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011); Kristen
Gwynne, How ‘Stop and Frisk’ is Too Often a Sexual Assault by Cops on Teenagers in Targeted
NYC Neighborhoods, ALTERNET.ORG (Jan. 21, 2013, 2:01 PM), available at http://www.alternet
.org/civil-liberties/how-stop-and-frisk-too-often-sexual-assault-cops-teenagers-targeted-nyc
[https://perma.cc/6AFA-DQZQ].
96 See The Wire: The Target, supra note 82 (Season One: Episode One).
97 The Wire: The Detail, supra note 88 (Season One, Episode Two).
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Daniels: Why?
Prez: He pissed me off.
Daniels: No, Officer Pryzbylewski. He did not piss you off. He
made you fear for your safety and that of your fellow officers.
I’m guessing now, but maybe he was seen to pick up a bottle
and menace Officers Herc and Carver, both of whom had al-
ready sustained injury from flying projectiles. Rather than use
deadly force in such a situation, maybe you elected to approach
the youth, ordering him to drop the bottle. Maybe when he
raised the bottle in a threatening manner, you used a Kel light,
not the handle of your service weapon, to incapacitate the sus-
pect. Go practice.98
Far from being the prototypical cop that the Court imagines in its
criminal procedure jurisprudence—presumptively good, committed to
getting the bad guy, adhering to the law, entitled to discretion, and
deserving of deference—The Wire again shows officers in a way that
seems truer to the real world: complicated and compromised, self-
interested, and not presumptively good at all.99
Although the focus of this part has been the many parallels and
juxtapositions that The Wire uses to depict the reality of policing and
the reality of police officers, I want to end this part by turning to how
the show uses metaphor, especially in one of the most oft-quoted
scenes from The Wire: the chess scene early in Season One. In the sce-
ne, D’Angelo Barksdale, who is Avon Barksdale’s nephew and a lieu-
tenant in the drug organization, teaches two of his street level workers
(Wallace and Bodie) how to play chess:
D’Angelo Barksdale: Now look, check it, it’s simple, it’s sim-
ple. See this? This the kingpin, a’ight? And he the man. You get
the other dude’s king, you got the game. But he trying to get
your king too, so you gotta protect it. Now, the king, he move
one space any direction he damn choose, ‘cause he’s the king.
Like this, this, this, a’ight? But he ain’t got no hustle. But the
98 Id.
99 David Sklansky makes a similar point, noting that what The Wire gets right, and makes it
beloved by law professors who teach criminal procedure and criminal law, is not “detailed accu-
racy about institutional failures, or the drug trade, or post-9/11 Baltimore, but something at once
bigger and more basic: the dimensions of human and moral complexity that criminal justice
work, in pretty much any time or place, will inevitably bring to the surface.” See David Alan
Sklansky, Confined, Crimes, and Inextricable: What The Wire Gets Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
473, 473 (2011).
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rest of these motherfuckers on the team, they got his back. And
they run so deep, he really ain’t gotta do shit.
Bodie: Like your uncle.
D’Angelo Barksdale: Yeah, like my uncle. You see this? This
the queen. She smart, she fast. She move any way she want, as
far as she want. And she is the go-get-shit-done piece.
Wallace: Remind me of Stringer.
D’Angelo Barksdale: And this over here is the castle. Like
the stash. It can move like this, and like this.
Wallace: Dog, stash don’t move, man.
D’Angelo Barksdale: C’mon, yo, think. How many time we
move the stash house this week? Right? And every time we
move the stash, we gotta move a little muscle with it, right? To
protect it.
Bodie: True, true, you right. All right, what about them little
baldheaded bitches right there?
D’Angelo Barksdale: These right here, these are the pawns.
They like the soldiers. They move like this, one space forward
only. Except when they fight, then it’s like this. And they like
the front lines, they be out in the field.
Wallace: So how do you get to be the king?
D’Angelo Barksdale: It ain’t like that. See, the king stay the
king, a’ight? Everything stay who he is. Except for the pawns.
Now, if the pawn make it all the way down to the other dude’s
side, he get to be queen. And like I said, the queen ain’t no
bitch. She got all the moves.
Bodie: A’ight, so if I make it to the other end, I win.
D’Angelo Barksdale: If you catch the other dude’s king and
trap it, then you win.
Bodie: A’ight, but if I make it to the end, I’m top dog.
D’Angelo Barksdale: Nah, yo, it ain’t like that. Look, the
pawns, man, in the game, they get capped quick. They be out
the game early.
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Bodie: Unless they some smart-ass pawns.100
To be sure, the chess game serves as a perfect metaphor for
Barksdale’s drug organization—the expendable pawns, the ambition
to be queen, and every player’s goal of protecting the king—but that is
not the only work this scene does. Pull back the lens, and the meta-
phor of the chess game is equally applicable to the Baltimore Police
Department, with its own expendable rank and file officers who still
aspire to rise through the ranks and to one day be Commissioner, the
metaphorical king. Because, in both cases, the king isn’t Barksdale or
a particular police commissioner. The king is the institution itself. The
game. That is what must be protected. And perhaps this is the most
important point.
Even the institution itself—the Police Department—does not have
the primary goal that the Court assumes. The police department
fights crime and purports to get the bad guys off the street, but only
some of the time. As one of the characters makes clear, many people
have the fate of dying “in a zip code that does not fucking matter” to
the police department.101 As the show makes clear, and as comports
with reality, “[a]ims like making the street safe . . . are consistently
subordinated.”102 There is always a more important goal: protecting
the police department itself.103 And as Bodie comes to recognize short-
ly before his death four seasons in, for people at the bottom, whether
they are police officers or drug sellers: “This game is rigged. We be like
the little bitches on the chessboard.”104
PART III: THEWIRE ASDISSENT
At bottom, the preceding parts have made two arguments. One,
that much of the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence is predicat-
ed on the assumption that the prototypical cop is good, adheres to the
law, is committed only to getting the bad guys off the street, can be
100 The Wire: The Buys, supra note 84 (Season One, Episode Three).
101 See The Wire: Dead Soldiers (HBO television broadcast Oct. 3, 2004) (Season Three, Epi-
sode Three). I have previously written about the unequal resources brought to bear on crimes
depending on the economic and racial status of the victim. See, e.g., Capers, Race, Policing, and
Technology, supra note 24, at 1252–4. This under-enforcement was brought to the Court’s atten-
tion in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), a capital case showing that, all other factors
being equal, prosecutors were more likely to pursue capital punishment in cases involving white
victims than in cases involving black victims. For a seminal discussion of this aspect of the case,
see Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988).
102 See The Wire: Dead Soldiers, supra note 101 (Season Three, Episode Three).
103 Bandes makes a similar point. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 438.
104 The Wire: Final Grades (HBO television broadcast Dec. 10, 2006) (Season Four, Episode
Thirteen).
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trusted with discretionary decisions, and is deserving of deference be-
cause of his particular expertise. Two, that The Wire stands in opposi-
tion to this view through its “non-fiction, truthtelling.”105 Ultimately,
the argument I have been attempting to make is that The Wire engag-
es in something that I have in previous work described as “de-
shadowing,” or bringing into the open how the criminal justice system
really works.106 If one thinks of the Court’s opinions in several crimi-
nal procedure cases as “majority” opinions, The Wire seems to offer a
much needed dissent. It does so by taking the majority to task for as-
suming officers are good, and fashioning pro-law enforcement juris-
prudence accordingly. It does so by showing the reality of policing on
the ground. Officer Friendly, The Wire says, is the real fiction.107 That
is the thrust of my argument. But to make this argument is to beg the
questions: What are the implications of such an argument? What does
it matter that The Wire speaks truth to power?
In this final part of this essay, I want to make the argument that
The Wire speaking truth to power can mean everything. Real change,
after all, often begins with popular culture. If Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
Uncle Tom’s Cabin could start a great war, if Sinclair Lewis’s The
Jungle could motivate the public to agitate for food-safety regulations,
if George Orwell’s 1984 still prompts us to be vigilant against govern-
ment control of how we think and speak, if the film Philadelphia could
change the way Americans think about gay men with AIDS, what
might the show The Wire, and other shows like it, do? I come to this
question not only as a law professor who writes and thinks about crim-
inal justice. I also come to this as a law professor deeply committed to
writing and thinking about the power of culture—literature, televi-
sion, music—to effect real change.
Regarding the power of culture, allow me to cite one example
where the legal landscape in the last thirty years has changed dra-
matically: gay rights and marriage equality. We have gone from the
Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,108 a case in which the Court
made it clear that if a state wanted to criminalize same-sex sex in the
privacy of a bedroom, the state had every right to do so,109 to the
105 See Simon, supra note 74.
106 See Bennett Capers, Notes on Minority Report, 42 SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 795, 796-98 (2009).
107 Or perhaps as the Urban Dictionary puts it, Officer Friendly “is the name of the police
officer who unjustly beat, arrested, or even killed someone.” See EVC, Officer Friendly, URBAN
DICTIONARY (June 5, 2007), https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=officer%20frie
ndly&utm_source=search-action [https://perma.cc/U7MJ-TNSQ].
108 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
109 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986), abrogated by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,110 which held that the criminal-
ization of same-sex sex conducted in private was a denial of liberty
under the Due Process Clause.111 And we have come to Obergefell v.
Hodges,112 the case holding that bans on same-sex marriage—or what
my friends prefer to call the denial of marriage equality—were uncon-
stitutional, violating both substantive due process and the right to
equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.113 This
sea change in legal rights, however, would have been impossible but
for the change in culture.114 To be sure, we should celebrate the law-
yers and advocates who played crucial roles in these victories. But
these victories may have been impossible without popular culture
leading the way through television shows featuring LGBT characters,
from Ellen to Buffy the Vampire Slayer to Will and Grace to Modern
Family.115 And of course, to The Wire and its depiction of Omar Little.
Omar Little, a favorite character on the show, is not only the epitome
of cool, and one of the few characters with an ethical “code.”116 He is
also both unapologetically black and unapologetically gay. It is com-
monly assumed that when President Barack Obama publicly an-
nounced his support of gay marriage, it did much to move African-
Americans on the issue.117 But it is also likely that the depiction of
Omar Little, mythic and heroic, played a role as well.118 Perhaps it is
110 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
111 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
112 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
113 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
114 Cf. id. at 2598 (“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did
not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to fu-
ture generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”).
115 See, e.g., Matt Wilstein, President Obama Credits Ellen DeGeneres With Turning the Tide
on LGBT Equality, THEDAILYBEAST.COM (Feb. 12, 2016, 1:14 PM), https://www.thedailybeast
.com/president-obama-credits-ellen-degeneres-with-turning-the-tide-on-lgbt-equality [https:
//perma.cc/4KMP-6JJG]; Alan Sepinwall, How Pedro, ‘Ellen,’ ‘Will & Grace’ and Other Gay TV
Icons Helped Pave the Way for Gay Marriage, UPROXX.COM (June 26, 2015), http://uproxx.com
/sepinwall/how-pedro-ellen-will-grace-and-other-gay-tv-icons-helped-pave-the-way-for-gay-marri
age/ [https://perma.cc/CT3K-5RLM]; James Kim & Michelle Lanz, How TV Shows like ‘Modern
Family’ Helped Shape Perceptions of Same-Sex Marriage, SCPR.ORG (June 26, 2015),
http://www.scpr.org/programs/the-frame/2015/06/26/43442/how-tv-shows-like-modern-family-hel
ped-shape-perce/ [https://perma.cc/VX9G-UWVM].
116 For more on Omar Little’s code, see Keith Reid-Cleveland, ‘It’s All in the Game’: Remem-
bering Omar’s Code on ‘The Wire,’ Uproxx.com, July 31, 2015, https://uproxx.com/tv/omar-the-
wire-quotes/.
117 See Brett LoGiurato, There’s Been an Unprecedented Shift in Attitudes about Gay Mar-
riage, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Feb. 24, 2013, 10:57 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/polls-
obama-gay-marriage-brief-prop-8-supreme-court-2013-2 [https://perma.cc/U3RP-VGFP].
118 The actor who played Omar has made this point as well. See Elizabeth Gettelman, All in
the Game, MOTHERJONES.COM (Oct. 2011), https://www.motherjones.com/media/2011/09/omar-
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not coincidental that Omar was Obama’s favorite character on The
Wire.119
If television shows and movies moved the country on marriage
equality and equal citizenship for the LGBT community, might shows
like The Wire do something similar with respect to criminal justice?
Might they play a role in opening people’s eyes to the fact that all is
not well, and there is still much work to do? Not work to “make Amer-
ica great again,” whatever that means, but to “make America what
America must become”120—“fair, egalitarian, responsive to the needs
of all of its citizens, and truly democratic in all respects, including its
policing?”121 The cultural theorist Stuart Hall has argued that police
dramas in particular can contribute to shaping attitudes about crimi-
nality and state power.122 Might The Wire, even more than the seem-
ingly ubiquitous videos of blue-on-black violence, even more than the
Black Lives Matter movement, open people’s eyes to possibility that
cops, too, manipulate evidence, tell untruths, and use excessive force?
Might shows like The Wire, to the extent they influence the culture
and move the needle, even “help change constitutional meaning?”123
I hope so. But even here, if I am honest, I know perhaps I am be-
ing overly optimistic. After all, part of the brilliance of The Wire is
that it resists a single interpretation and resists, too, my effort to con-
script it into an argument about policing and criminal justice, or even
about the mythology the Court subscribes to in imagining police offic-
ers. At the end of the day, the cops in The Wire—even the ones who
seem incompetent (e.g., Officer Pryzbylewski), who engage in unlawful
force (e.g., Detective Kima Greggs), who lie or encourage others to do-
so (e.g., Lieutenant Daniels)—are not evil. We identify with them and
understand them, even when we cannot root for them. Some, like Of-
ficer Pryzbylewski, even emerge by the end as heroes—small letter “h”
heroes—of sorts. The officers are three-dimensional—compromised
michael-kenneth-williams-interview/ [https://perma.cc/YF48-K95C].
119 See Caitlin McDevitt, Omar Gets Props from President Obama, POLITICO.COM (Mar. 1,
2012 1:47 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/click/2012/03/omar-gets-props-from-president-
obama-116102 [https://perma.cc/M56L-4JPX].
120 See JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 9 (Modern Library ed. 1995) (1963) (“[G]reat
men have done great things here, and will again, and we can make America what America must
become.”).
121 See Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, supra note 28, at 880.
122 See generally STUARTHALL, POLICING THE CRISIS (1978).
123 See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391, 425 (2016).
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and conflicted, facing competing interests including self-interest, and
ultimately pawns of a much bigger system. But then, maybe this is the
larger, ultimate point. Because, if nothing else, The Wire shows that
the police are human, just like everyone else. No better, no worse.
Maybe that is a start. Maybe that, too, is oppositional.
